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HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, EDITH STEIN, AND GERDA WALTHER
I do think that in normal times a lot of good female thinking
is wasted because it simply doesn’t get heard. 
(Mary Midgley, Owl of Minerva: A Memoir, 
Routledge 2005, 123)
The resurgence of interest in early phenomenology and the history of the phe-
nomenological movement has brought to light the fact that several women took part in 
it and contributed to its development. Though their names are often unknown in the 
context of academic and international studies, there is no doubt that at least three wom-
en phenomenologists have received increasing attention in the last years: Hedwig Con-
rad-Martius (1888–1966), Edith Stein (1891–1942), and Gerda Walther (1897–1977).
These philosophers share several common traits. Firstly, they were among the 
first women in Germany to study at grammar school (Gymnasium) and then at uni-
versity, and to write a dissertation. Moreover, the three belonged to the first gene-
ration of phenomenologists active during, and immediately after, Edmund Husserl’s 
time. Stein and Conrad-Martius studied with Husserl and Adolf Reinach in Göttin-
gen; in 1916 Stein followed Husserl to Freiburg and defended her dissertation under 
his supervision. Also, Walther took courses with Husserl in Freiburg and studied with 
Alexander Pfänder, one of the main proponents of the phenomenological tradition in 
Munich. However, all three phenomenologists encountered a fundamental barrier in 
the difficulty to find a university where they could write a Habilitation, an essential 
condition when applying for academic positions.
The three thinkers related to the concept of phenomenology of the so-called 
“Munich and Göttingen circles,” i.e., two groups of young disciples from the Uni-
versity of Munich and Göttingen (since 1907, around Edmund Husserl), who were 
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motivated by the wish to respond to Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things them-
selves’,” which he first articulated in his Logical Investigations (1900–1901). Inspired 
by Husserl’s struggle against psychologism and relativism, the members of both circles 
were convinced that objects and their modes of knowing were established upon the 
lawfulness of essence, which is independent from the thinking subject and conscious-
ness in general.
Moreover, Conrad-Martius, Stein, and Walther have a personal and original 
way of developing phenomenology in common, regarding both the conception of 
phenomenological method and the field of objects this method addresses. Stein de-
voted herself to the theoretical project of connecting Husserl’s rigorous description 
and Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics, with particular regard to the structure of the hu-
man person; Conrad-Martius established a relationship between ontology of real be-
ing and science, by elaborating an original philosophy of nature; Walther dedicated 
herself to diverse subjects, such as ontology of social communities, phenomenology 
of mysticism, mental illness, and parapsychology. Such philosophies have received 
increasing attention over the last few years, particularly in connection with the role 
of metaphysics in phenomenological inquiry, human soul depth, man’s natural origin, 
and religious experience. 
The aim of this issue of Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology is to present in-depth 
studies that shed new light on these thinkers’ contribution to broaden the field of phe-
nomenological research, from both an historical and a systematic point of view. More 
generally, the ambition of the volume is to promote research on women phenomeno-
logists, whose theoretical relevance was often obscured or dismissed due to social-gen-
der grounds. However, focusing on this subject does not entail imposing gender bar-
riers as analysis criteria and thereby limiting a narrow field of research that stresses 
the differences between men’s and women’s phenomenological contributions. Instead, 
the studies included in this volume aim at extending the customary network of phe-
nomenological studies, within which the thinking of women was very often neglected. 
Furthermore, since the latter introduced original topics in the field of philosophy, in-
quiry into their thinking enables the reconstructing not only of the phenomenological 
movement but also of new chapters of the history of philosophy in general.
The special issue begins with Irene Breuer’s article „Conrad-Martius: Sein, We-
sen, Existenz. In Auseinandersetzung mit der Ontologie und Metaphysik Aristoteles‘, 
Thomas von Aquins und Husserls“. The author compares Conrad-Martius’ concep-
tion of Being and existence with the ontologies of Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl, 
while delving into the problems of both hypostatization and origin of Being; in this 
regard, the notion of analogia essendi plays a central role. By doing so, she shows how 
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Conrad-Martius accepts the positing of a sphere of original and given facts that are 
self-grounded and self-sustained, and how her research traces the origin of these back 
to a “transphysical” realm, thus revealing the grounds for the Husserlian sphere of 
primal facts. Hence, as Breuer claims, Conrad-Martius’ and Husserl’s investigations 
encounter and complement each other at the point where the real bursts into reality 
and becomes available to consciousness. 
Simona Bertolini in her article — „Zwei Phasen in der Entwicklung der Unter-
suchung Hedwig Conrad-Martius‘ zum Sein des Menschen und der Lebewesen“ — 
asserts that Conrad-Martius’ investigation on human being and living things does 
not remain unchanged over the decades. In particular, she distinguishes between two 
phases through which Conrad-Martius’ anthropology and biological ontology devel-
op. In the first phase, at the beginning of the twenties (precisely in the work Meta-
physical Dialogues), the philosopher explains the essential differences between plants, 
animals, and humans with reference to a vital origin preceding the constitution of re-
ality; to describe it Conrad-Martius employs terms such as “abyss” and “under-earthly 
realm.” In the second phase, exemplified by some writings published in the forties and 
the fifties, the reference to such a dimension disappears and the eidetic variety within 
the living world, including human specificity, is exclusively traced back to finalistic 
substantiation of essences in natural beings. 
Anna Jani’s article „Die seelischen Akte in der Anthropologie. Edith Steins 
phänomenologische Einsicht“ concerns Edith Stein’s philosophy and aims at proving 
that spiritual acts play a decisive role in the methodological constitution of phenom-
enology and have a crucial function in the theoretical structuring of the phenom-
enological description of the person. Firstly, Jani examines the implications for an-
thropology that arise from Edith Stein’s phenomenology; secondly, she underlines the 
metaphysical presuppositions of anthropology in Stein’s thinking. In both stages, the 
investigation engages with Husserlian insights that Stein takes on board and creatively 
introduces into her own work; this engagement with Husserl emerges in the way Stein 
structures anthropology and describes the person as a psychophysical individual. At 
this point, as Jani points out, the question arises regarding how the description of 
the spiritual acts can contribute to the foundation of anthropology as a philosophi-
cal-theological science. 
In his article, “Core of the Essence and Core of the Person: Jean Hering and a 
Hidden Source of Edith Stein’s Early Ontology,” Daniele De Santis argues that Jean 
Hering can be considered the source from which Edith Stein first borrowed the con-
cepts of “core” and “core of the person.” In particular, De Santis maintains that the 
background of Stein’s decision is represented by the original version of Hering’s book-
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let Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee (1921), namely, the Ap-
pendix to his still unpublished dissertation on Lotze. Furthermore, the author does 
not fail to stress both analogies and differences: whereas Hering introduces the con-
cept of “core” merely to discriminate between different types of essences within the 
framework of a general attempt to determine the structure of individual essences, 
Stein takes it to characterize always and exclusively the structure of the person and its 
mode of being, thus paving the way for her future personalistic ontology. 
Timothy Burns, in his study “Phenomenology without Egology: Edith Stein as 
an Original Phenomenological Thinker,” examines Edith Stein’s relationship to phe-
nomenology while considering three related questions: (1) What did Stein conceive 
phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? 
(3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? Burns argues that Stein con-
ceives phenomenology as a epistemological critique that aims at clarifying the essen-
tial foundations of knowledge, and that the primary influence Husserl exerts on her 
philosophy is based on the development of phenomenology as described in Logical 
Investigations. Furthermore, the article offers an understanding of how Stein con-
ceived her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that her 
phenomenological descriptions in On the Problem of Empathy and Sentient Causality 
offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the 
ego but escapes being a mere egology. 
In “The Challenges I-Splitting or Ichspaltung for the Phenomenology of Edith 
Stein and Gerda Walther,” Antonio Calcagno reads Edith Stein and Gerda Walther 
with reference to the problem of I-splitting, by wondering how one and the same I 
can perform different acts while preserving its disinterested autonomy and identity. 
Calcagno stresses that both philosophers introduce a form of I-splitting inasmuch as 
they describe lived experiences in which the unity of the individual, personal I is chal-
lenged or negated through intense forms of sociality and intersubjectivity achieved 
in community and telepathy as well as ruptures in the constitutive unity of persons 
through soullessness. The author argues that these phenomena challenge not only 
the unity of I experience but also phenomenology’s claim of the capacity of a pure 
and absolute ego to grasp philosophically and scientifically the objective sense of its 
investigations.
Patricia Feise-Mahnkopp’s article (“In-between Mind, Spirit, and Being: A Crit-
ical Appreciation of Gerda Walther’s Phenomenology of Mysticism with Particular Ref-
erence to Correspondences to Post-Materialist Notions of Reality”) concerns Gerda 
Walther’s Phenomenology of Mysticism, in which the philosopher, on the basis of a 
complex notion of human being, exposes the unio mystica as meta-transcendental 
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constitution of fundamental spiritual being by proposing a genuine approach that 
pushes the transcendental idealistic paradigm further. The article aims at examining 
the implications of this approach. On the one hand, the author specifies that a critical 
distinction must be made between the — phenomenologically demonstrable — phil-
osophical content of Walther’s investigation and its theologically motivated readings. 
On the other hand, the article aims at highlighting the philosophical significance of 
Walther’s work, that is, its contribution to the philosophy of mind/spirit and being, 
and its relation to postmaterialist notions of reality.
In his text, “On Filozofówna’s Criticism of Blaustein’s Phenomenology of Aes-
thetic Experience,” Witold Płotka expands the thematic field of the issue and focus-
es on the Polish thinker Irena Filozofówna, a yet another woman in the context of 
phenomenology. In particular, the author analyzes and discusses the 1931–32 debate 
held by Irena Filozofówna and Leopold Blaustein on the structure of aesthetic expe-
rience and the methodological background for describing psychic life. In this regard, 
the article presents arguments, concepts, and methodologies of the two opposing po-
sitions, after having outlined biographical sketches of both philosophers. Moreover, 
Filozofówna’s criticism of Blaustein’s approach (based on the claim that he confuses 
presentations with judgments) as well as Blaustein’s replies are considered.
Finally, Joachim Feldes guides the reader through the letters Alexandre Koyré 
wrote to Hedwig Conrad-Martius from 1911 to 1933 („Ein Samovar für die Phänom-
enologie: Briefe von Alexandre Koyré an Hedwig Conrad-Martius aus der Zeit bis 
1933“), which prove the existence of a personal and philosophical relationship be-
tween the two philosophers — a relationship that begun in the context of the “Göt-
tingen circle” and also involved Theodor Conrad (Conrad-Martius’ husband since 
1912). By following the content of Koyré’s letters, Feldes reconstructs the development 
of this relationship over the years, thus providing a significant example of dialogue 
which took shape between the members of the phenomenological movement.
As editors of this Special Issue of Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology, we are 
grateful to the editorial board of the journal and to all authors who have worked hard 
to carry out this project. Special thanks go to Natalia Artemenko, the editor-in-chief 
of Horizon, who has actively supported our work and the idea of publishing a spe-
cial issue devoted to “Women Phenomenologists.” Last but not least, we are sincerely 
thankful to Beate Beckmann-Zöller and Joachim Feldes for their generous help with 
the language of the German articles. 
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